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CHURCH V. CALLANAN INDUSTRIES, INC.I
(decided November 19, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate divi-
sion's order granting summary judgment for the defendant subcon-
tractor San Juan, and held that a subcontractor's contractual
obligations to a general contractor did not create a duty of care to
third parties, and therefore the subcontractor cannot be held liable
in tort for a breach of those obligations. 2 However, the court iden-
tified three exceptions to this general rule in which a duty of care to
non-contracting third parties may arise out of a contractual obliga-
tion.3 The first exception allows a third party to recover when the
promisor creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, or in-
creases that risk.4 The second exception imposes liability where a
plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of reasonable reliance upon
the defendant's continuing performance of a contractual obliga-
tion.5 Lastly, the third exception imposes liability "where the con-
tracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to
maintain the premises safely. "6
II. BACKGROUND
On December 26, 1992, plaintiff Ned Church, age nine, was
rendered quadriplegic when his mother, Barbara Church, the
driver of the car in which he was a rear seat occupant, fell asleep at
the wheel.7 The vehicle veered off a New York State Thruway, nar-
rowly missed the northern end of a guiderail, plunged down an em-
1. 99 N.Y.2d 104 (2002).
2. Id. at 110.
3. Id. at 111.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 113(citing Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., Inc., 98
N.Y.2d 136, 140 (2002); Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 589
(1994)).
7. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 109.
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bankment and crashed into a ditch.8 The site where the vehicle
veered off the highway was within a 22-mile resurfacing and safety-
improving project, which was completed in 1986 pursuant to an
agreement between the Thruway Authority and Callanan Industries
Inc., a general contractor.9
The agreement between the Thruway Authority and Callanan
provided for the removal of 275 feet of existing guiderail and its
replacement of a longer, 312.5 feet, guiderail system. 10 The
Thruway Authority also contracted with Clough, Harbour & Associ-
ates, a construction engineering firm, to inspect and supervise Cal-
lanan's compliance with the contract.1 Under the contract
between the Thruway Authority and Callanan, Clough's recommen-
dation was required before final acceptance of Callanan's work. 12
Subsequently, Callanan entered into a subcontract with defendant,
San Juan Construction and Sales Company, for the installation of
the guiderail system. 13 The subcontract incorporated the general
contract between the Thruway Authority and Callanan by refer-
ence. 14 Although the contract specified for the installation of 312.5
feet of guiderail, defendant San Juan only installed 212.5 feet of
guiderail at that location. 15
Suit was brought on behalf of infant plaintiff, Ned Church,
against Callanan, San Juan, and Clough Harbour in the New York
Supreme Court. The plaintiffs' stated causes of action were for neg-
ligence-the negligent failure of San Juan to complete the full
312.5 feet of new guiderailing and Clough Harbour's negligent in-
spection and approval of the installation despite it's
noncompletion.' 6
Callanan and San Juan moved for summary judgment dis-
missing the complaint, arguing in part that as contracting parties
8. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 109.
9. Id. at 110.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 110.
13. Id.at 109.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Church v. Callanan Industries Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001).
16. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 109-10.
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they owed no duty to the plaintiffs. 17 The plaintiffs responded by
arguing that both defendants undertook a duty to perform safety
improvements and were liable for their "negligent performance of
these improvements [which] directly caused Ned Church's inju-
ries."18  The supreme court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. 19
On appeal from the supreme court, the appellate d§ivision, in
a three to two decision, reversed and granted summary judgment to
San Juan, determining that San Juan did not owe the plaintiffs a
duty of care. 20 In coming to this conclusion, the appellate division
analyzed several existing authorities. 21 First, the court noted that
an important consideration mitigating against third party liability is
the fact that the defect was readily observable.22 Second, courts will
not impose liability in "favor of a class of plaintiffs that either en-
compasses so many or is so remote as to exceed 'controllable lim-
its."' 23 Third, there must be a reasonable proximity between the
performance of the contractual obligation and the resulting in-
jury.24 Lastly, the court of appeals has continuously held that an
injured non-contracting plaintiff must show reliance on the contin-
ued performance of a contractual obligation, and that the failure to
fulfill that obligation resulted in "positively or actively" causing the
injury, as opposed to merely withholding a benefit.25
In applying these considerations, the appellate division con-
cluded that imposing liability on San Juan would expand "the zone
of duty beyond acceptable public policy limits." 26 The court noted
that the hazard, the missing guardrail, was "readily observable at all
17. Id. at 110.
18. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 110.
19. Id.
20. Church v. Callanan Industries Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 545, 551 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001); Church v. Callanan Industries Inc., 99 N.Y.2d 104, 110 (2002). (noting that dur-
ing the pendency of the appeals, plaintiffs settled their suits against Callanan and
Clough Harbour).
21. Church, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 548-49.
22. Id.
23. Id at 549. (citing Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 405 (1985); Waters
v. New York City Hous. Auth., 69 N.Y.2d 225, 230 (1987)).
24. Id.
25. Church, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 549(citing Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83
N.Y.2d 579, 587 (1994)).
26. Id. at 546.
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times," including "when Clough Harbour inspected and approved
the work, when the State accepted and paid for the work and in the
intervening years when the length and location of the guardrail was
plainly visible to passing State maintenance and repair crews, State
engineers and the traveling public."27 The court also noted that
the "class of potential plaintiffs would be virtually limitless," because
it would consist of all motorists that use that section of the
thruway. 28 The plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals as of
right, pursuant to CPLR 5601 (d), on the basis of the two-Justice
dissent at the appellate division.2 9
III. DIscussIoN
The court of appeals began its discussion with a brief statement
of the "threshold and dispositive" question on this appeal: whether
San Juan owed the infant plaintiff a duty of care.30 The court stated
the general rule that "ordinarily, breach of a contractual obligation
will not be sufficient in and of itself to impose tort liability to non-
contracting third parties upon the promisor."31 The court of ap-
peals further stated that an injured party from a breach of a con-
tractual obligation is limited to contractual remedies.3 2
Nevertheless, the court identified three exceptions to the gen-
eral rule, in which a duty of care will exist as to non-contracting
third parties.33 In such cases, the promisor will be subject to tort
liability. 34 The first exception allows a third party to recover when
the promisor creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, or
increases that risk. 35 The second exception imposes liability where
a plaintiff has suffered injury as a result of reasonable reliance upon
the defendant's continuing performance of a contractual obliga-
27. Church, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
28. Id.
29. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. RULES & PROC., §5601(d) (McKinneys 1995); Church, 99 N.Y.2d
at 110.
30. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 110.
31. Id. at 111. (citing H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160 (1928;
Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 220, 226 (1990).
32. Id. (citing PROSSER & KEArON, TORTS, §92, at 656, 5th ed (1984)).





tion.36 Lastly, the third exception imposes liability "where the con-
tracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to
maintain the premises safely."
37
The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs failed to qualify
under any of the three stated exceptions. 38 As to the first excep-
tion, there was no evidence in the record that San Juan's failure to
perform it's contractual obligations created or increased the risk of
the car to veer from the thruway, beyond the risk that existed
before any contract was made with San Juan.39 The court drew a
distinction between breach of contract cases where a party has cre-
ated or increased the risk, and cases in which a party is "merely
withholding a benefit", and classified San Juan in the latter cate-
gory.40 San Juan's failure to install the length of the guiderail re-
quired by the contract resulted in merely neglecting to make the
highway more safe, rather than making the highway less safe, than
it was prior to the safety improvement project.
4 1
The case also did not fall within the second recognized excep-
tion, in which liability is imposed where a plaintiff has suffered in-
jury as a result of reasonable reliance upon the defendant's
continuing performance of a contractual obligation. 42 The court
concisely stated that it could not be contended that "the tragic loss
of control of the car occurred because the driver 'detrimentally re-
lied on the continued performance of [San Juan contractual] du-
ties' when she failed to remain awake and alert at the wheel."
43
The case also did not fall within the third recognized excep-
tion, which imposes liability "where the contracting party has en-
tirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises
safely."44 Under the contractual framework, the Thruway Author-
36. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 111-12.
37. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 112(ciing Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., Inc., 98
N.Y.2d 136, 140 (2002); Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 589
(1994)).




42. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 112.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 140 (2002);
Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 589 (1994)).
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ity, not San Juan, assumed the duty to oversee, insure, and finally
inspect the installation of the required length of the guiderailing. 45
In concluding that the third exception was inapplicable to San
Juan, the court of appeals discussed two cases, Palka v. Servicemaster
Mgt. Servs. Corp.46 and Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc. 47 ,
which are instructive on the issue of imposing tort liability in
breach of contract cases. 48 Both cases support the proposition that
"tort liability for breach of contract will not be imposed merely be-
cause there is some safety-related aspect to the unfulfilled contrac-
tual obligation.
49
In Palka, the court of appeals imposed third-party liability on a
maintenance company with whom a hospital had a service contract.
The court said the contract was "comprehensive and exclusive" as
to preventative maintenance, inspection, and repair.50 Therefore,
because the defendant undertook all aspects of safety inspection
and repair, the defendant ought to foresee the likelihood of harm
to third persons as a result of the hospital's reasonable reliance on
the defendant to discover or repair dangerous conditions. 51
The court of appeals distinguished Espinal,in which the court
declined to impose tort liability on a snow removal contractor. 52
The court stated that absent evidence that Melville Snow Contrac-
tors, Inc. created or aggravated a dangerous condition, the land-
owner at all times retained its duty to inspect and safely maintain its
premises. 53
The court of appeals likened San Juan with Espinal. 54 Unlike
the defendant in Palka, San Juan did not assume all of the safety
obligations in relation to the guiderail system.55 The Thruway Au-
thority entered a separate contract with Clough Harbour to provide
for inspection and supervision of the guiderail project, which in-
45. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 114.
46. Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579 (1994).
47. Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136 (2002).
48. Church, 99 N.Y. 2d at 112.
49. Church, 99 N.Y. 2d at 112.
50. Id. at 113.
51. Id.
52. Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136 (2002).
53. Id. at 141; Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 113.




cluded San Juan's compliance with the provisions providing for
guiderail length. 56 Therefore, it was evident that San Juan never
assumed the Thurway Authority's tort duty to supervise and guaran-
tee the installation of the safe length of the guiderailing system.
5 7
IV. CONCLUSION
In Church v. Callanan Industries, Inc., the New York Court of
Appeals held that defendant San Juan's breach of its contractual
obligations did not render it liable in tort to non-contracting third
party plaintiffs. 58 The court also held that the three recognized ex-
ceptions that do impose tort liability on a contracting party for fail-
ure to complete its contractual obligations were not applicable to
San Juan.5 9 Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed




56. Church, 99 N.Y.2d at 113.
57. Id. at 114.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 112.
60. Id. at 114.
20031

